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The question whether humanity has a predilection towards the good is preceded by the question
whether there exists an event that can be explained by no other way than by that moral disposition. An
event such as revolution
Friedrich Nietzsche

As much as the Northeastern region of India is an important and complex cartographic reality
in Indian politics, with a long history of frontier politics, it has increasingly become a zone
where physical power assumes a central role in the struggles to bring an end to its human crises.
These crises are manifested through violence, insurgency and separatism.1 This frontier space
is pertinent to the debates on people’s revolutions and homelands, resulting in the construction
of a political discourse on citizenship and peoplehood. The region has remained, arguably, for
the larger part of the nation’s history, a peripheral fragment of the Indian imagination. The
region’s existence in the national imaginary is predicated on rebel mobilizations, unrest and
resistance from the earliest times in the colonial period.2 At the same time, the region continues
to occupy a seminal position in the territorial history of the postcolonial nation.
Context of Crisis
During the period of British rule, this region was closely connected with the rest of the Indian
subcontinent and formed part of the continuous landmass stretching from eastern Bengal and
Bihar, into the Brahmaputra valley of Assam, and further into the Burmese uplands. Despite
the colonial empire’s somewhat uneasy relationship with the ‘Nagas’ of the Naga Hills (in the
erstwhile undivided province of Assam), who find mention in the earliest histories and official
records, as a “people of one of the Burmese provinces”, the Nagas were soon shrouded in an
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ambivalence that has made it difficult to recover their links to the Indian mainland.3 For
genealogical reasons and certain administrative measures related to the governance of ‘tribes’
in far-flung areas of northeastern India, both during and immediately after the colonial era, the
Nagas were not directly part of the newly formed Indian nation-state. Once this region became,
by default, a periphery of the centre, a variety of socio-economic and historical factors surfaced.
This led to the rise of militant ethno-nationalism in the Naga Hills, which did not abate even
after it gained statehood and was declared separate from Assam in 1963 (Misra, 265). Notions
of Nagaland’s “territorial mystery” and alienation of the people have long attended the social
historical imagination about the Nagas, something that was also typically noted by the British
when they governed these provinces. Perhaps this could explain how the Nagas have remained
known, even to the Indians, as a somewhat uncertain group, linguistically and ethnologically,
exotic and “isolated” (G.A Grierson 1903; J.W Hutton 1969; Christoph Von Furer-Haimendorf
1962).4 These questions carry over to the Nagas’ ‘unique identity’ in the contemporary
moment.5
The state of Nagaland in India's northeastern border is a region that has consequently
been involved in a long and embattled struggle for its own homeland and independent
nationhood for more than 70 years. Its secessionist movement, predating the independence of
the nation, has its origins in a history of ancient clans and tribal communities remaining beyond
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In the Account of the Nagas recorded in the Calcutta Government Gazette (1825), Lieutenant Pemberton who
travelled extensively in these provinces writes, “this race of people...extending from the northwestern extremity
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the grip of the colonial state so much so that the life of the Nagas is still replete with tales of
"primitive warfare", "head-hunting” and connections across the borders to Myanmar, China
and beyond. The Nagas people have been caught in a spiral of nationalist resistance with several
tribes mobilizing for non-state rebellion and separatist activity, making the people strangers in
their own legitimate country.
While this paper briefly explores the causes and processes that chart this particular push
away from the nation state, it focuses on the struggle for statehood that has, in many ways,
dehumanized and dispossessed the tribal community on the fringes of the India state. Pertinent
to this, are questions surrounding the reinforcement of divisions and boundaries within peoples
in a country, as well as how the Naga tribes create the idea of a community while the church
and civil society groups continue to demand for a homeland even as the Indian nation state
attempts to broker peace with the insurgent leaders, some of whom have sought solidarity and
support from across the borders.
In this context, the Naga struggle for the right to self-determination has been seen as a
threat to the larger Indian identity. The Nagas were the first ethnic group to successfully mount
a challenge to the process of nation-building in post independent India. It is significant that, for
the first time in the history of independent India, the armed struggle of a small group aimed at
achieving a sovereign status was accepted as a struggle for self-determination (Misra, 268).
The unfolding of the Naga rebellion and the formulation of a long national struggle
from within the nation-state points to several realities on the ground. It questions ideas about
what ethnic movements can do to the notion of democratic life, apart from the issue of human
rights and gender concerns that seek to forge democratic alternatives. Therefore, it is important
to understand these questions from formulations and positions drawn up by recent political
theorists and philosophers in this respect and examine how people’s power can energize new
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forms of governance in an increasingly controlled world of biopolitics.6 Made prominent in
social theory by Michel Foucault, the biopolitical and its procedures of power were either
meant to discipline the human body, to optimize its capabilities, or to extract its force while
rendering it more inefficient and docile. Foucault’s famously proposed series of biological
processes, such as birth rates, mortality, or life expectancy, have strongly influenced and
provided control over a population (Agamben 2005; Foucault 2003, 2007, 2008; Hardt and
Negri 2004).
I argue that the Naga example from South Asia’s northeastern Indian upland territory
evokes a dynamic theatre of social revolution where people, politics, custom and tradition all
come together in a curiously interconnected manner to retrieve their own sense of space and
community. In Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism, the “backward” community, or
tribal, is considered, as she had observed, not deserving of that stage of civilization that insures
it with human rights that are only guaranteed with national emancipation.7 The people of the
Naga borderlands inhabited a similar space whereby they were subject to despots or totalitarian
powers of the state. Thus, their history was inextricable from those who had fallen outside,
what Arendt calls, “the common world”, because of their mere differentiation.8
Thus, the Nagas’ protest and rise into a secessionist state can perhaps be traced back to
this condition of differentiation. The birth of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim
(NSCN) in 1980 was the product of an “Indian nationalism”, a sort of negotiation with the state
that often ended in rejection of the plea for self-determination or autonomy of the rebel state
(Banerjee, 221). The predominance of extremist non-state mobilizations and a politics of

6

First advanced in his History of Sexuality (1984), Michel Foucault developed the notion significantly with his
College de France lectures between 1976-1979.
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See Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, p370
8
I find it pertinent here to quote Arendt’s very sharp comment on the loss of human rights, which she argued
was a ‘paradox’, which “coincides with the instant when a person becomes a human being in general-without a
profession, without a citizenship, without an opinion, without a deed by which to identify and specify himselfand different in general, representing nothing but his own absolutely unique individuality which, deprived of
expression within and action upon a common world, loses all significance.” p383
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resistance by tribal groups in the borderlands of the Indian state have typically facilitated a
policy of militarization by which governments at the centre have been extending grants to a
small section of the local elite that have been co-opted into the task of governance. This is a
strategic ruse to keep the masses at bay and out of the ambit of participation in the nation-state
through a few feeble attempts to demonstrate a semblance of representation by calling upon
the communities of the various tribes to articulate their demands and aspirations (Kikon, 2833).
In recent times, the Naga tribes, who are a composite group (officially recognized as constituted
of 16 ethnic groups who collectively form the umbrella community, the Nagas), have even
been brought under a national framework, such as in 2015 to draft a peace accord. 9
This paper looks at how postcolonial societies may often seek to look beyond the state
at systems of power that emerge from older and less formal communities: multitudes that
engage not merely with politics, rights, justice, and the economic question, but also
significantly with that of the ‘biopolitical’ as a category. In this respect, the biopolitical gains
credence as the Nagas have eternally been seen as societies of people who have remained
deeply and organically bound up with the myths and meanings of their evolution in the
mountainous territories. More importantly, they have gained recognition as an autonomous race
and nation in the making that is extremely proud of its ancient heritage, its ethnic origins and
local knowledges.10 The inter-factional conflicts among the Nagas have often been used and
exploited by centers of authority and control to keep this major community of tribes in unrest.
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Skeptics are of the opinion that the peace-work was not a multilateral agreement involving all groups of the
various Naga ethnicities but manipulated by the dominant NSCN (IM) faction, led by the very powerful duo,
Isak and Muivah, among the several militant groups who had brokered a deal with the Indian government on
sharing sovereignty. See, for instance, Namrata Goswami, “The Naga Peace Accord and the Troublesome Idea
of Shared Sovereignty” 2017
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A S Shimray, Let Freedom Ring: The Story of Naga Nationalism. New Delhi: Promila and Co. 2005
For a better understanding of the question of the biopolitics and the apparatuses of social control , I refer to
Michel Foucault work on bio-power and biopolitics developed in his lectures at the College de France(1975-79)
later published as Society Must be Defended (2003), Security, Territory, Population (2007) & The Birth of
Biopolitics (2008)
Also , Giorgio Agamben’s theory of exclusion as he demonstrates in his understanding of Jewish
marginalization in World war II in his Homo Sacer and Bare Life , and The State of Exception ( 2002)

Moral6

Such unrest is another major spoke in the cycles of violence and aggression perpetrated both
by state and non-state powers. To argue from a historical perspective, the biopolitical
management of populations and the control of borders and sensitive space, as this discussion
will attempt to unfold, in respect to the Naga national struggle for more than seventy years
now, is crucial to the definition of being human today. Such an argument becomes clearer when
examining Giorgio Agamben’s and Michel Foucault’s work on biopolitics to explore the
relationship between spaces and borders and what it means to be human in these entangled
histories. In the concluding part of this discussion, I seek to argue how the counter narratives
of gender and everyday life, as well as practices within a rebel society, work back from these
received frames of wisdom to undermine the official historiography of custom and tradition
towards newer mobilizations of resistance and greater spaces of freedom in the Naga
borderlands.
Between the 1980s and 90s, the Naga territory became increasingly militarized as New
Delhi’s failure to appreciate the question of a Naga nationhood resulted in the deployment of
security forces that were meant to control the region and its peoples’ native viewpoint. This
was another powerful agent of control that was exercised upon the people of Nagaland in
dramatic ways when the Armed Forces Special Powers Act11, a draconian act, was invoked in
the state, as it was in neighboring Assam, and unleashed a reign of extrajudicial oppression and
excesses. As Udayon Misra has argued, the realization that the Naga struggle was not a law
and order problem, nor merely a secessionist insurgency fueled by foreign agents, or simply a
movement triggered by ethnic claims, but a deeper political issue which could never be solved

The states of Nagaland and Manipur in the Northeast have been declared as “Disturbed Areas” under the
Government of India’s Armed Forces Special Powers Act, AFSPA (1958). This Act enables the government to
deploy national army and central paramilitary forces as well as the Indian reserve battalions to control, manage
and to gain a better insight into these measures of state control. It is useful to note how in the colonial regime, as
early as in 1935, the Northeast frontier region had already been declared as Disturbed Areas and Excluded areas
by an Act of the imperial government, Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas Act (1935)
11
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through the use of force, leading to the creation of a separate state for the Naga people within
the Indian Union (Misra, 269).
The creation of a Nagaland state and the implementation of strict Inner Line
Regulations (which barred entry by outsiders into this excluded zone), along with clear
constitutional safeguards for the protection of their land, culture, and identity have helped to
neutralize the demand for sovereignty. The state apparatuses clearly played their cards with
care and sought to compensate the Nagas with such measures of protection and preservation.
While the NSCN (I-M)12 has been steadfast in its demand for a solution of the Naga issue
outside the parameters of the Indian Constitution, it cannot disregard the collective voice of
Naga civil society, which favors a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the Naga issue.
Although a formal resolution of the Naga struggle is yet to be achieved, the long-drawn
resistance has raised vital issues relating to the polity, emphasizing the need for a re-working
of the federal priorities of the country and the constituent autonomies of its people (Misra, 270).
Birth of a State
More than any other claim, the Naga movement has been asserting a distinct ethnic identity
and demanding an independent homeland. Multiple attempts were initiated via memorandums
and directives that emphasized the Nagas and Indians as separate with no common history and,
hence, Nagas should be given independent status.13
What began as the first rebel Naga group in 1918, the Naga Club proclaimed resistance
to the Indian government under the erstwhile colonial empire. This group was renamed and
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The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) is a Naga nationalist insurgent group operating mainly in
Northeast India. The agenda of the organisation is to establish a sovereign Naga state, ‘Nagalim’, which would
consist of all the areas inhabited by the Naga people in Northeast India and Northwest Myanmar. NSCN- (IM)
and NSCN-K are two factions of the NSCN.
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The Naga Club demanded of the Simon Commission as early as in 1929 to be left “alone to determine for
ourselves as in ancient times”. The Naga Hills Memorandum to Simon Commission, dated 10 Jan, 1929
(available online in post by John Humtsoe , 5 April 2013, accessed 13 November 2017)
For a clear idea of how the Naga ‘nation’ movement gathered momentum and has sustained and survived
various challenges to arrive at a critical stage of negotiations with the Indian nation state read B G Verghese
2008; MS Prabhakara 2007, and Sanjoy Hazarika 1994, Sanjib Baruah 2010, Udayon Misra 2013
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reorganized as the Naga National Council (NNC) in 1946 by Angami Zapu Phizo.14 On June
27, 1947 an agreement was signed between the NNC and then Governor of Assam that
recognized the Nagas’ right to develop themselves freely. However, Clause 9 of the agreement,
stating that after a period of 10 years the NNC would be asked whether the agreement should
be extended or a new agreement arrived at, created divisions amongst the Naga groups. The
NNC interpreted this to mean the attainment of sovereignty by the Nagas whereas the
Government of India interpreted it as the signing of a new arrangement within the Indian Union.
On August 14, 1947, Phizo, along with eight other Naga leaders, declared Naga independence.
In 1960, a Sixteen-Point Agreement was signed between members of the Naga People’s
Congress and the Government of India that included the creation of a new state of Nagaland
by 1963. But even this failed to quell the movement as a majority of Naga inhabited areas was
left outside the new state. In 1964, a Nagaland Peace Mission15 was formed and signed a
ceasefire with Phizo, only to last till 1968. The coopting of the church with the entry of
Reverend Michael Scott, a Baptist Missionary, and one of the first among the peace negotiators
in 1964, along with eminent Gandhian Jayprakash Narayan and BP Chaliha, Assam’s Chief
Minister, for the cause of the Naga rebels, marked a very significant aspect of the Naga national
struggle. The crucial peace salvo, preceded by signing a ceasefire with the insurgents, also
heralded the long and integral bond between Christian civil society groups and the Naga
national movement, right up to the present.
NSCN (I-M), the later day avatar of the NNC, then emerged as the major insurgent
group and succeeded in integrating rival Naga ethnic groups, which stood otherwise divided.
The network of social support for the faction’s political causes of establishing the uniqueness
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Phizo contacted the Indian National Army (INA) in Burma (Myanmar) with the hope of obtaining their help
to overthrow British rule from Naga areas. Interestingly, when the Japanese forces advanced towards Kohima
(capital of Nagaland) in 1944, Phizo simultaneously advanced to Kohima with a group of armed Naga men in an
attempt to liberate Naga areas from British rule.
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For more details on the Nagaland Peace Mission, see Y.D Gundevia, War and Peace in Nagaland p101-126
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of Naga history (that they were independent and never conquered by the British or any other
power), and Greater Nagalim (integration of Naga inhabited areas in Assam, Arunachal and
Manipur, all of which are adjoining Indian states in the northeastern frontier region) struck a
responsive chord in the Naga society that it aspired to represent. In 1964, with regard to the
political agenda, T Muivah, the formidable NSCN chief, spoke to a gathering of about 5000
people and asked their opinions on whether to abrogate or extend the ongoing cease-fire with
the Indian government. The overall popular consensus was that the ceasefire should not be
abrogated and that it should, in fact, be extended indefinitely, unlike the usual practice of
extending it for six months or a year in order to sustain some level of continuous peace in Naga
areas.
The Peace Mission's proposals marked a major departure from what may be termed the
'mainstream' position regarding the Naga struggle and heralded the beginning of a new and
positive approach to the Naga issue (Misra, 268). Over forty years of struggle and several
thousand Naga youth, soldiers, and innocent civilians left dead, have left a fatigue in the
revolutionary zeal, even as it promised freedom and a nation for the Nagas.
Civil Society Interventions: Church and Collectives
The Naga hills resonate with the sound of church bells chiming or hymn notes lifting and falling
by a choir echoing in the distance. To most Nagas, this is sacrosanct. The Council of Naga
Baptist Churches is an apex body in Nagaland with a membership of 42 church associations.
Not only has it been central to Naga civil society as a cohesive and cementing force among the
different tribes with their traditions and customary mores, but it has also been most instrumental
in bringing about the peace process since the 1960s. Thus, the Church’s attempt to resolve
rebellion and allay hostilities among warring militant groups in Nagaland has typically paid
heed to allowing the Council to continue to be in constant contact with underground factions.
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This communication has allowed the Council to dissuade the different factions from violent
activities and aim for a settlement instead.
However, the NSCN (I-M) has been critical of the Council and has made claims that it
is favouring the Indian state (Kumar, 156). In a manner that evokes the Foucauldian power of
biopolitics as mentioned earlier, the apex Council of Nagalim Churches (CNC) has also been
an agency for control at the center of negotiations for most political strategists in the Naga
struggle. The CNC has served as an unfailing handle with which to prod the sensitive issues of
countering insurgency in a rebel environment and for finding consensus among tribes in a
divided and ethnically polarized society.16 In its passionate call for a “Nagalim for Christ”, the
CNC wields civil authority over, what seems to be, a society divided over ethnic differences at
a time when greater human concerns of security and safety outweigh these narrow parochial
issues.
The Naga Mothers’ Association (NMA) and Issue of Gender
Like most women’s movements concerning political and ethnic violence, the women in the
Naga struggle have witnessed severe physical, economic, and mental brutality at the hands of
security forces and non-state actors. Women, those directly involved in the struggle and
ordinary women, have lived in ‘states of exception’ and led precarious lives.17 The preeminent
Naga People’s Movement for Human Rights has extensively documented the perils and
precariousness of ordinary people caught in the militarized environment in the wake of the
Naga national struggle. However, the Naga Mothers’ Association (NMA), an interventionist
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Council for Nagalim Churches (CNC) has relentlessly tried to negotiate on behalf of the various tribes and
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Performativity, Precarity and Sexual Politics, Lecture given at Universidad Complutense de Madrid. June 8,
2009
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civil society group of women established in 1984, has attempted to ameliorate a lot of the
tensions and trouble in Naga society, often remaining independent of church and state.18
Unlike the Naga HoHo, the umbrella group of civil society collectives that has led many
peace negotiations in the state, the NMA works within a clearly feminist framework, beyond
the concerns of clan or clout of the former. The major breakthrough came with the humanistic
call, Shed No More Blood, which was introduced during a 1994 peace rally to combat and
counter the intra-fratricidal killings in Nagaland leading to a climate of terror and unabated
violence in the nineties.19 It resolved, for instance, to stop the various modes of aggression in
Naga society. The NMA, it affirmed, believes that violence against women will continue unless
other forms of violence are also stopped. The group has brought international attention to
human rights violations in the Naga Territory, particularly sexual violence. Their practice of a
“politics of understanding” provides a model for how the democratic process ought to be
carried out and for the importance of inclusion in democratic dialogue. With the rise of several
factions within the Naga state in the aftermath of the formation of the NSCN, women’s
organizations have sought to address issues of violence and exploitation perpetrated against
them as a result of being caught in the violent crossfire. There have been instances when women
have physically intervened in villages and towns to act as barriers between civilians and
soldiers (Manchanda, 6). They have tirelessly fought for a repeal of the Armed Forces Special
Powers Act.
A politics of power and gender has taken over in this strife over ethnic identity and
homeland struggle in the Naga hills, leading to an insidious oppression where women are
attacked out of vengeance, especially if they have affiliations to suspected rebels. Women’s
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Association of Nagaland among other such initiatives.
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bodies, for example, considered to be the enemy’s property, were sexually mutilated
(Manchanda, 7). The struggle has caused massive destruction to resources and affected
agricultural practices that are intrinsic to daily life. The destruction of agriculture has severely
affected women as they were previously actively involved in this field. Under these severe
conditions, the women have also supported the armed struggle by providing food and clothing
for the armed opposition.
The biopolitics of survival has also led these women to the rebel camps, where they
eventually took to weapons, even though it is against tradition and considered a taboo for them
to participate in typically ‘male’ activities. Many women were trained by the outfits and came
out as fully trained soldiers to join the factions. Although the NNC had initially hesitated to let
women receive training or carry arms, increasing attacks on women who sought refuge in the
church made them review their opinion and they sanctioned the active entry of women in the
rebellion. As a critic of the insurgency in the region observes, the NMA has however, not been
very successful in their attempts to curb the violence in the region. In fact, many women “reject
the need for women to be involved in representative politics” (Manchand, 11).
As in other vulnerable societies, especially where male and female functions and social
roles are separate, militarized zones have typically witnessed the reinscription of gender
discrimination in conditions that make women doubly marginal. The victimization of women
who leave homes to participate in war has already been a subject of wide debate and critical
discussion.20 The making of such women into political subjects, witnessed more recently in the
uproar over Naga women’s decision to participate in urban elections to which they had never
been represented before, has now emerged as a complex issue of feminist rights where the basic
safety of women as humans, their self- esteem, and the notions of bare life beg to be reexamined.
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As the Naga feminist, Dolly Kikon, pointedly asks, “What comes first for her people,
gender or justice?”21 Or should these wait till they gain freedom? Kikon’s anxiety about her
tribe is vindicated in the violent clashes between men and women that took place on the streets
earlier this year over the question of political rights for women. While Naga customary law is
seen as the foundation of justice, the exclusion of women from the state’s powerful decision
making-bodies negates this. Putting aside all other claims, the human question underpins the
tragic consequences of this long-drawn battle in restive Nagaland.
The NMA has used a rhetoric of motherhood for mobilization and has been critiqued
for not having a radical feminist agenda they ought to have had as a women’s group
(Manchanda, 13). The NMA chose to wear as a badge of honour their larger social/moral
outlook that made it incumbent on the group to look into issues of life and death in the violenceafflicted neighborhoods. They mandatorily conducted, for example, burials that they gave to
each unclaimed body in order to restore the rightful dignity of those who fell to militarized
operations, whether they were Nagas or non-Nagas. While such rituals were in place given the
extreme nature of oppressions that were easily committed under the draconian law AFSPA
which granted impunity to the Armed Forces, the NMA came to be seen less as a feminist
collective and more focused on social responsibilities.
The Human Question
Construction of the definitions of ‘anti-national’ severely restricted civil and political rights in
militarized zones, like the north-eastern region of India, where the discourse of participation
and ‘'rights' was entrusted to security institutions armed with regulations like the National
Security Act, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958, the Nagaland Security Act 1962 and
the Disturbed Areas Act 1955 (Misra, 2835). In his theory of the ungoverned, while
deconstructing the binary that pits the civilized valley dwellers against the hill folk, or the
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‘zomia’, James Scott confronts the idea of disabling the non-state people with his novel
suggestion that the zomia may actually escape the state (Scott 34). It can be argued that the
Naga struggle for a homeland and sovereignty, coupled with its ability to continue to seek
measures for a peaceful resolution of its many crises social, political, and psychological, signal
toward an affirmation and belief in the power of peoplehood.
A particularly telling phenomenon that is striking about this movement is the several
stages of its trajectory that mark the transition from a belligerent insurgent led group of rebels
to actual peace makers and facilitators of an organic community. Also significant in this long
history of a people’s revolution, are the multitudes that warred, fought, lost, congregated,
mourned, commiserated and renewed vigor also while reviewing their positions in the struggle
for freedom. The new peace Accord, which is currently in the making with a composite Naga
civil society participation and which may decide the destiny of the Nagas, holds out promise
of such a reconfiguration of energies and intentions.
The lasting effects of the conflict of the Naga conflict has resulted in a damaging rise
of unemployment and a poor education system. The conflict pushed the region and its people
into a state of exception that became “essentially an empty space, in which a human action with
no relation to law stands before a norm with no relation to life” (Agamben, 86). In these
intangible interfaces between life, the law and a native Naga society, the human has remained
out of the ambit of the state jurisdiction. The law is safeguarded from any challenge to its
rationale and implementation, providing the arbiters of such a justice with impunity from all
authority or accountability. As Agamben notes about the contemporary human condition,
“from the real state of exception in which we live it is not possible now to return to the state of
law…” (Agamben 87). To resolve the crisis of humanity in the Naga borderlands, Agamben’s
utopian wish for a severance between violence and law is perhaps the only way that peace can
be imagined and for bare life, as it exists, without any rights, to be overcome.
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Before we can even achieve peace and claims of gender justice across territorial and
historical differences and beyond national and ideological boundaries, the Naga example, as
demonstrated in the discussion above, firmly reiterates the need for a humane, more habitable
and livable world.
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